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Sammendrag 
Paperet analyserer likevektssammenhengen mellom en gitt økning i skattefinansiert offentlig 
sysselsetting og total sysselsetting, med hovedvekt på en bestemt inntektseffekt: Når arbeidskraft 
omallokeres fra privat til offentlig sektor, reduseres den delen av arbeidstilbydernes arbeidsuavhengige 
inntekt som kommer i form av overskudd, siden det ikke er overskudd i offentlig produksjon. Denne 
effekten kan føre til at likevektssammenhengen mellom total sysselsetting og skattefinansiert offentlig 
sysselsetting blir positiv, også i det tilfellet der den ukompenserte arbeidstilbudselastisiteten med 
hensyn på lønn er positiv. En slik positiv likevektssammenheng er konsistent med det man har 
observert i generøse velferdsstater som for eksempel Norge og Sverige. Paperet utleder presise 
betingelser for en positiv likevektssammenheng innenfor en enklest mulig modell. Det viser også at 
dersom likevektssammenhengen er positiv, vil den være sterkere desto høyere den offentlige 
sysselsettingen er. Likevektssammenhengen viser seg å være viktig for å forklare sysselsettings-
effektene når man bruker en realistisk CGE modell av norsk økonomi til å simulere virkningene av en 
eksogen økning i skattefinansiert offentlig sysselsetting. 
1 Introduction
In highly plausible scenarios for the next decades most OECD countries and several other
countries face a strong growth in the demand for health services and old-age care, due to
i.a. population ageing, further income growth, and a modest potential for input saving
productivity growth in long-term care, see e.g. OECD (2013). In most countries these
services are mainly provided by the government sector and tax financed. On average,
general taxes and social security contributions financed nearly three-quarter of all health
spending in 2008 in the OECD countries, see OECD (2010). Maintaining this high degree
of government responsibility, these countries face a substantial acceleration of the growth
in public employment, which commands growth in the tax burden.
The subject of this paper is the effect of tax financed growth in public employment on
total employment. In addition to being a direct political goal, a high employment rate is
the ultimate financial base of public welfare. In particular, the sustainability of welfare
states, in which tax rates and and social security benefits are relatively high, relies on
high employment rates, see e.g. Andersen (2009). So far the ability of the Scandinavian
welfare states to combine high tax rates on labour with high employment ratios, have
been relatively successful. Some scholars assess this success as striking, see e.g. Andersen
(2009).
The high correlation between tax rates, public welfare and employment in the Scand-
inavian countries is particularly striking when it is compared with the analysis in Prescott
(2004). He concludes that differences in tax rates can account for most of the differences
in supply of man hours per capita between the US and some larger European countries.
To a large extent Ohanian, Raffo and and Rogerson (2006) support Prescott’s conclu-
sion. On the other hand, it has been questioned and critisized by Ljungquist and Sargent
(2007) and Andersen (2009). In particular, Prescot relies implicitely on a wage elasticity
of labour supply which is much higher than what is typically found in the vast empirical
labour supply literature, surveyed in e.g. Evers, De Moij and van Vuuren (2005) and
Meghir and Phillips (2008). The majority of empirical studies indicate that a decrease in
the after-tax real wage rate has a relatively small negative effect on total labour supply
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at the intensive margin, reflecting a weak dominance of the substitution effect over the
income effect.
Most likely, employment ratios and labour supply are the result of a large number
of interacting mechanisms in addition to taxes. For example, Rogerson (2007) stresses
that international comparisons of employment ratios and taxes should take into account
how the government spends the tax revenues. The negative effect of higher tax rates on
labour supply is reinforced if the tax revenue finances transfers that work as subsidies of
leisure. This effect has played a major role in the recent wave of reforms of the public
old-age pension systems, which aim to strengthen labour supply incentives. On the other
hand, the negative labour supply effect of higher tax rates is mitigated, and may be
reversed, if the additional tax revenue finances increased provision of public services that
are substitutes for household production, see e.g. Lindbeck and Parameswar (1990). Care
for children and the elderly are good examples in this respect.
This paper analyses one particular mechanism, which contributes to a positive rela-
tionship between tax financed public employment and total employment. More precisely,
it accounts for general equilibrium modifications of the income effect on labour supply:
Increasing tax financed employment in non-profit government sectors reduces capital in-
come distributed to workers by crowding out private production, which generates normal
returns to capital. Together with the standard income effect of raising labour income
tax rates, the reduction in this kind of non-labour income stimulates, cet. par, labour
supply. Specifically, the general equilibrium relationship between total employment and
tax financed government employment may be positive, even if the uncompensated wage
elasticity of labour supply is positive. To my knowledge this equilibrium effect is not
recognized in the literature which analyses the relative strength of the counteracting
substitution and income effects on labour supply induced by a higher labour income tax.
This idea is explored within the simplest possible model. The analysis is confined
to general equilibria, where changes in total employment equal labour supply responses.
Thus, it disregards Keynesian situations in which budget neutral increases in government
spending and taxation may stimulate aggregate demand and employment. The relevance
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of the analysis is therefore likely to be greater for the long-term rather than the short-term
effects.
Section 2 presents the theoretical model used to analyse the determinants of total
employment. In particular, it clarifies the precise conditions for a positive equilibrium
relationship between tax financed public employment and total employment. These con-
ditions show that the combination of a positive uncompensated wage elasticity of labour
supply and a positive equilibrium effect on labour supply of raising tax financed public
employment cannot be ruled out as unrealistic. The analysis also examines the nature
of the non-linearity of the employment effect of higher public employment. It is found
that if this effect is positive, it will be stronger the higher is the initial public employ-
ment. These results are interesting when one tries to explain the combination of high
employment and high tax rates in the Scandinavian welfare states, but the theoretical
analysis cannot say anything about their empirical relevance. However, Section 3 demon-
strates that the analysed mechanisms at least play an important role when one uses a
large and realistic CGE model of the Norwegian economy to simulate the employment
effects of higher public employment. Section 4 adds some discussion to a summary of the
conclusions.
2 Theoretical analysis
2.1 The model
Consider a small open economy in which one competitive private industry use labour
(LP ) and capital (K) to produce one good which can be consumed or invested as capital.
The product price and the interest rate, r, are exogenously determined in the world
markets. The product price is normalized to unity. Abstracting from depreciation and
taxes, the capital cost equals r. The technology exhibits constant returns to scale, and
the marginal cost function is c (PL, r), where PL is the labour cost. Perfect competition
implies 1 = c (PL, r), which determines PL. r (as well as other variables affecting PL),
will be constant in the analysis, so the measure of labour units is chosen so that PL = 1.
The time index is suppressed except when dynamics are explicit. Specifically, K−1 is
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the productive capital stock prior to investment in the period we consider. Investments
take place instantaneously at the start of each period. Then the optimal input of labour
and capital per produced unit will be constant and equal to aL =
∂c(PL,r)
∂PL
and aK =
∂c(PL,r)
∂r
respectively. The demand for labour and capital from the private industry can
then be written
LP = aL (C + K −K−1) , (2.1)
K = aK (C + K −K−1) , (2.2)
where C is private consumption, and K −K−1 is investment in the period we consider.
Let LG denote government employment used to produce public services, that do not
enter the utility function. The government expenditures equals the wage bill, which is
financed on a pay-as-you-go basis by a tax on labour only. More precisely we assume
that this tax is a payroll tax, and that t is the payroll tax rate. The government budget
constraint is then (1 + t) LG = t (LP + LG), which can be written
t =
LG
LP
. (2.3)
A representative consumer faces the real wage rate, W = (1 + t)−1, and an exogenous
time endowment T . He maximizes a utility function of C and leisure F , subject to the
budget constraint C = L
1+t
+ rK and the time constraint T = L + F , where L is total
labour supply. The capital income rK is the only type of non-labour income, I. It is
perceived as given by the consumer. We study equilibria where
L = LP + LG. (2.4)
We assume that the utility function takes the CES form. Given the price normaliza-
tions, the optimal ratio between consumption and leisure becomes
C
T − L = b (1 + t)
−σ , (2.5)
7
where b is an exogenous preference parameter, and σ is the elasticity of substitution
between consumption and leisure. These five equations determine the endogenous varai-
ables LP , t,K, L and C. The appendix shows that the implicit equilibrium solution for L
can be written in the following reduced form:
L− LG = aLb
(
1− LG
L
)σ
(T − L) + aK [L− L−1 − (LG − LG,−1)] (2.6)
This solution for L captures both the income effect of government employment, as
well as the substitution effect on labour supply caused by revenue neutral adjustments
of the payroll tax rate. A key feature in this model is that it also includes the feedback
on capital income resulting from changes in private employment.
2.2 Stationary effects
We shall first confine the discussion of the equilibrium relationship between LG and L
to stationary time paths. All exogenous variable except LG are constant, whereas LG is
increased to a new permanent level in period 0. As capital does not depreciate, there will
be no investment except for period 0, when K−1 is predetermined. We will first examine
the stationary effects, obtained in period 1, 2, ..., before we characterize the short term
effect obtaiend in period 0.Since K −K−1 = L−L−1 = 0 both before and after the shift
in period 0, the long run solution for L becomes
L− aLb
(
L− LG
L
)σ
(T − L) = LG. (2.7)
The left hand side may be interpreted as the excess labour supply from the household, i.e.
total labour supply less the labour demand needed to produce the household consumption.
It is easily seen that a proportional shift in T and LG results in the same proportional
change in L. Define eG as the long run elasticity of L with respect to LG. The Appendix
shows that (2.7) implies
eG =
1− σ
H − σ . (2.8)
Here H = H (LG, L, T ) = LLG
(
T−LG
T−L
)
> L
LG
> 1 summarizes all information about the
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initial state of the economy that is relevant for eG. The main purpose of this paper is to
analyze the state dependency of eG, especially how eG depends on LG. To get intuition
on the role of the forces working through H, note that H−1 equals the the elasticity of
L with respect to LG, contingent on a constant ratio between consumption and leisure
C
T−L = b
(
L−LG
L
)σ
, see Appendix. Recall from (2.5) that keeping C
T−L constant implies
that H−1 ignores the substitution effect caused by the change in t. Thus, H comprises the
repercussions on the excess labour supply working through non-substitution effects. These
are of two kinds. First, raising L by 1 percent, increases this excess labour supply by L
LG
percent. Second, raising L by 1 percent reduces, cet. par, leisure by L
T−L percent. Keeping
C
T−L fixed implies that consumption and a thereby private employment also decreases by
L
T−L percent. Cet. par, this raises the household excess labour supply by
LP
LG
(
L
T−L
)
percent. The total excess supply effect becomes L
LG
+ LP
LG
(
L
T−L
)
= L
LG
(
T−LG
T−L
)
= H.
We are now able to discuss rigorously the properties of eG. eG (σ,H) is decreasing
in σ in the domain σ > 0, σ 6= H. eG (σ,H) is a hyperbola with horisontal asymptotes.
limσ→0 eG = H−1 is the maximum asymptote for 0 < σ < H . limσ→∞ eG = 1 is the
minimum asymptote for σ > H . Table 1 provides more information on how eG depends
on σ.
Table 1. Elasticity of employment wrt. public employment
σ → H+ σ → H− σ=H+1
2
σ= 1 σ→ 0
σ − 1 + + + 0 −
σ −H + + − − −
eG ∞ −∞ −1 0 H−1
Table 1 also demonstrates the following result, which can be directly derived from
(2.8):
Proposition 1 A marginal increase in LG, financed by an increase in the payroll tax rate,
will reduce total equilibrium employment when H > σ > 1, and increase total equilibrium
employment when σ > H or 0 < σ < 1.
In order to assess the plausibility of these situations, it is necessary to have intuition
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on the order of magnitude of H. H is determined once LG is set, but it depends in
a complex way on all exogenous variables and parameters through L, cf. (2.7). This
dependency will be taken explicitly into account below. At this stage it is instructive
to see that realistic outcomes of the model above suggest that H is much greater than
unity. Assume for example that in a period of a day T = 24 − 10 = 14 hours can on
average be allocated to leisure and work, and that LG = 2. Moreover, assume that the
parameters in the model, i.e. aL, b and σ, imply L = 7. This implies H = 6 (and LP = 5
and t = 0.4.) Consider then alternative situations in which LG has been raised, combined
with a change in model parameters so that L remains equal to 7. For example, raising
LG from 2 to 3.5 then implies H = 2.1, LP = 3.5 and t = 1, which implies that the
consumer wage rate equals 50 percent of the labour cost per hour.) Raising LG further
to 42
3
implies H = 2, t = 2 and LP = 213 . An extreme case would be that t = 3, which
implies LG = 514 , LP = 1
3
4
and H = 12
3
. As pointed out in the introduction, σ is likely
to be relatively close to unity. Henceforth, we will therefore confine the discussion to the
realistic case where H > σ (corresponding to the left arm of the hyperbola of eG graphed
as a function of σ). Then the only possibility for eG > 0 is that 0 < σ < 1, and the upper
limit of eG is H−1 < 1.
2.3 The link between the employment effect and individual behaviour
This section examines how the equilibrium elasticity eG relates to the partial elasticities
of the individual labour supply. Let l (W,T, I) be the individual uncompensated labour
supply function derived by maximizing utility with respect to C and F , taking W , T and
I = rK as given. Define lW (W,T, I) and lI (W,T, I) as the corresponding labour supply
elasticities with respect to W and I. In the present model these elasticities take the form
lW (W,T, I) =
(
T − L
L
)
[θC (σ − 1) + αI ] =
(
T − L
L
)
θC
(
σ − WL
WL + rK
)
(2.9)
lI (W,T, I) = −
(
T − L
L
)
αI , (2.10)
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where θC = CWT+rK =
WL+rK
WT+rK
is the optimal budget share of consumption in total ex-
penditure, which equals total virtual income WT + rK. αI = rKWT+rK is the share of
non-labour income in total virtual income. The second expression for lW is derived by
utilizing that 1 − αI
θC
= WL
WL+rK
. As is well kniown, the combination of no non-labour
income and σ = 1, i.e. Cobb-Douglas preferences, implies lW = 0, since the substitution
effect excactly neutralizes the income effect. The existence of positive non-labour income
increases cet. par the wage elasticity, because it reduces the weight of the income effect
caused by the increase in the wage rate. With positive non-labour income lW ≥ 0 requires
σ ≥ WL
WL+rK
< 1.
The Appendix shows that eG can be written in terms of the individual labour supply
elasticities as follows:
eG = lW
∂W
∂LG
LG
W
+ lI
∂ (rK)
∂LG
LG
rK
, (2.11)
when one takes into account that ∂W
∂LG
LG
W
= LG
LP
(eG − 1), and ∂(rK)∂LG
LG
rK
= L
LP
eG − LGLP in
this model. Thus, there are two reasons why eG differ from the partial labour supply
response to a given change in the wage rate induced by a change in t: Firstly, eG takes
into account that capital income will change by the same proportion as employment in
the private industry. Secondly, eG captures that the change in the wage rate will be
endogenous, since the tax base is proportional to the employment in the private industry.
Proposition 2 When non-labour income is positively related to labour income through
equilibrium effects, and σ = 1, there is no equilibrium effect on total employment of an
increase in tax financed government employment, whereas the individual uncompensated
labour supply response to the partial decrease in the conumer real wage rate is negative.
Proof. It follows directly from (2.9) that lW |σ=1 =
(
T−L
L
)
αI > eO|σ=1 = σ−1σ−H = 0.
2.4 Non-linearity and state dependence
This section analyses how eG depends on the initial LG. The insights from this analysis
is important in order to see how L will respond to non-marginal increments in LG. We
shall confine the analysis to the most relevant parameter combinations, i.e. 0 < σ < H .
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Let ElLGeG (LG) be the elasticity of eG with respect to LG. Under this assumption we
shall prove the following proposition:
Proposition 3 ElLGeG (LG) > 0, and sign
(
∂eG
∂LG
)
= sign (eG). Consequently, if eG > 0,
then L is progressively increasing in LG, even if LG is financed by a tax on labour income.
Conversely, if eG < 0, an increase in LG further reduces eG. Raising LG increases the
upper limit for eG when 0 < σ < H.
Proof. ElLOeo (LO) can be written
ElLOeo (LO) = −
(
H
H − σ
)
hO, (2.12)
where ho ≡ ElLOH is the total elasticity of H (L,LO, T ) with respect to LO. hO becomes
ho = (eO − 1) +
( −LO
T − LO
)
−
( −L
T − L
)
eO =
(
T
T − L
)(
eO − L
LO
H−1
)
. (2.13)
The first statement in the proposition follows from the following implications: 0 < σ <
H ⇒ eO < H−1 < LLO H−1 ⇒ ho < 0 ⇒ ElLOeo (LO) > 0. The sign of
∂eO
∂LO
then follows
from the expression:
∂eO
∂LO
= eO
ElLOeo (LO)
LO
. (2.14)
Thus, |eG| is increasing in LG, and the effect is self-reinforcing. Recall that eG > 0
when 0 < σ < 1, and eG < 0 when 1 < σ < H . hG < 0 also implies that H−1,
the upper limit for eG when 0 < σ < H , increases when LG increases. However, it
is not obvious that an equilibrium exists for any choice of LG. Numerical experiments
based on a plausibly parameterized version of the model above, demonstrate for example
that a general equilibrium may not exist when LG is raised beyond 50 percent of total
employment when σ = 1, 5. The reason is that the necessary tax rate then becomes so
high that the representative individual will not demand - for leisure or for production
of private consumption - the hours which has not employed in the public sector. The
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Appendix describes the assumptions underlying this numerical experiment.
Intuition on the equilibrium relationship between public and total employment can
be obtained through the following reasoning: For a given L, an exogenous rise in LG
equal to 1 percent disturbs the labour market equilibrium through two channels: 1) the
increase in LG creates an equally large excess labour demand; 2) the higher tax rate
needed to finance the higher public employment induces a negative substitution effect on
private consumption, which causes a fall labour demand from the private sector equal to
σ percent. Consequently, prior to adjustment of L, raising LG by 1 percent, increases the
excess demand for labour from 0 to 1−σ percent of the initial LG-level. If labour supply
were increased so that L increased by 1 percent, would affect this imbalance by H − σ
percent of the initial LG-level. Recall that H measures the net excess labour supply effect
of a proportional decrease in leisure and private consumption. Ex post the increase in LG,
the additional labour supply will be employed in the private sector, thus contributing to
reduce the tax rate. For concreteness, assume that σ < 1 < H. Then the labour market
equilibrium can be restored by a sufficiently large increase in L, i.e. eG > 0. The smaller
is H − σ, the weaker is the fall in excess labour demand for a given increase in L, and
the necessary employment effect has to be stronger.
Recall that σ < H ⇒ hG < 0, because a higher LG implies that both a given percent-
age increase in L and the reduction of leisure (proportional to the reduction of private
consumption) represents a relatively smaller contribution to rebalancing the labour mar-
ket. Measured in percent of the initial LG-level, these effects are, respectively, LLG and
LP
LG
(
L
T−L
)
. They add up to H: L
LG
+ LP
LG
(
L
T−L
)
= L
LG
(
T−LG
T−L
)
= H. This explains why a
given increase in LG reduces H, which in turn commands a greater increase in L in order
to restore labour market equilibrium than in the case with a smaller initial LG.
2.5 Short run effects
Since K−1 is predetermined in period 0 when LG increases, investments will temporarily
deviate from 0 in this period. Consequently, the employment effect in this period differs
from the stationary effect dicussed above. We confine the analysis to marginal changes
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based on a linearization of the equilibrium condition for the labour market (2.6) around
a stationary equilibrium in period -1. We have L0 − L−1 = dL0, LG,0 − LG,−1 = dLG,0.
Let f (L,LG) ≡ aLb
(
1− LG
L
)σ
(T − L) denote the non-linear term in (2.6). A linear
approximation of the change in L between the periods -1 and 0 yields df0 =
∂f−1
∂L
dL0 +
∂f−1
∂LG
dLG,0. Here f−1 = f (L−1, LG,−1) = L−1 − LG,−1, and the partial derivatives are
∂f−1
∂L
=
[
σ
(
LG,−1
L−1−LG,−1
)
−
(
L−1
T−L−1
)]
f−1
L−1
and ∂f−1
∂LG
= −σ
(
LG,−1
L−1−LG,−1
)
f−1
LG,−1
. The Appendix
shows how these expressions can be used to obtain the short run equilibrium relationship
between marginal changes in L and LG respectively:
(
LG,−1
L−1
σ − T − LG,−1
T − L−1 + aK
)
dL0 = (σ − 1 + aK) dLG,0. (2.15)
The corresponding short run elasticity of L with respect to LG, contingent on a budget
neutral payroll tax rate adjustment, can be written:
eG, =
dL0
dLG,0
LG,−1
L−1
=
σ − 1 + aK
σ −H−1 + L−1LG,−1 aK
, (2.16)
where H−1 =
L−1
LG,−1
(
T−LG,−1
T−L−1
)
. eG,0 degenerates to the corresponding stationary elasti-
city, eG, when aK = 0, which is equivalent with no investments, when the initial H in
(2.8) equals H−1. Compared with the corresponding long run elasticity, eG, the numer-
ator in eG,0 is increased by the input share of capital, aK , whereas the denominator is
increased by L−1
LG,−1
aK . In order to compare the short run and the long run elasticities, we
calculate
eG,0 − eG = σ − 1 + aK
σ −H−1 + L−1LG,−1 aK
− σ − 1
σ −H−1 =
aK
(
1− e0 L−1LG,−1
)
σ −H−1 + L−1LG,−1 aK
(2.17)
Thus, eG,0 > eG if eG < LGL ∧ σ − H−1 + L−1LG,−1 aK > 0or if σ − H−1 +
L−1
LG,−1
aK <
0 ∧ eG > LGL . Is this likely? Confining the discussion to the most realistic case where
0 < σ < H . In this case it was shown above that eG < H−1 = LGL
(
T−L
T−LG
)
< LG
L
, so
the numerator in (2.17) is positive. Thus, in this case eG,0 > eG if the capital share aK
and/or the employment share of the private sector L
LG
= 1 + LP
LG
sufficiently large to make
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σ − H−1 + L−1LG,−1 aK > 0. Note that in this case the short run elasticity may be positive
whereas the long run elasticity is negative. This is the case if σ − 1 + aK > 0 > σ − 1.
Moreover, unless L−1
LG,−1
aK is "too large", the denominator in eG,0 will be closer to 0 than
the negative denominator in eG, and the short run employment response may be much
greater in absolute value than the long run response.
The expression for eG,0 implies the following proposition:
Proposition 4 A marginal increase in aK from 0 implies
∂eG,0
∂aK
∣∣∣
aK=0
= 1 − L−1
LG,−1
eG,0 =
1− L−1
LG,−1
eG. Thus, if eG < 0 ⇔ H > σ > 1, then ∂eG,0∂aK
∣∣∣
aK=0
> 1. Therefore eG < eG,0 < 0
for at least small values of aK , i.e. the decline in L is smaller in the short run than in
the long run. If σ = 1 ⇔ eG = 0, eG,0 = aKL−1
LG,−1
(
aK−
T−LG,−1
T−L−1
) = 0, and ∂eG,0
∂aK
∣∣∣
aK=0
= 1.
When aK > 0, the sign of eG,0 depends on the sign of
T−LG,−1
T−L−1 − aK. |eG,0| → ∞ when
T−LG,−1
T−L−1 → aK . If 0 < eG < 1 ⇔ 1 > σ > 0, eG,0 may become negative with a high absolute
value, since a higher aK reduces the absolute value of the initially negative denominator.
Proof.
∂eO,0
∂aK
∣∣∣∣
aK=0
=
σ −H−1 − (σ − 1) L−1LO,−1
σ −H−1 = 1−
L−1
LO,−1
(
1− σ
H−1 − σ
)
= 1− L−1
LO,−1
eO,0, (2.18)
since eO,0 = 1−σH−1−σ when aK = 0. It follows that
∂eO,0
∂aK
∣∣∣
aK=0
> 1 when eO,0 < 0, and
∂eO,0
∂aK
∣∣∣
aK=0
= 1 when eO,0 = 0. This proves the first two parts of the proposition. The
last part follows follows directly from the ambiguity of the sign of ∂eO,0
∂aK
∣∣∣
aK=0
when eO,0 >
0.
3 Empirical relevance
One way to check the empirical relevance of the mechanisms discussed above is to simu-
late the effect on total employment of increasing public employment on a Computational
General Equilibrium (CGE) model, which provides a realistic description of an actual
economy, including the forces that affect total employment. There are numerous such
CGE experiments. Here, we shall consider some of the results for the Norwegian eco-
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nomy presented in Holmøy, Kravik, Nielsen and Strøm (2009) (hereafter HKNS). HKNS
simulate the effects of increasing the employment in the government Health and Care
sectors on government finances and macroeconomic aggregates. All these simulation ex-
periments were budget neutral through endogenous adjustments of the payroll tax rate.
To this end HKNS employed a version of the so-called MSG6 model, which is a large
scale CGE model of the Norwegian economy.
The MSG6 model is described in e.g. Heide, Holmøy, Lerskau and Solli (2004) and
Holmøy and Strøm (2011). In the present context the most important features are:
Supply and demand are balanced in all specified markets, including the labour mar-
ket, producers and consumers behave rationally according to microeconomic theory, the
government revenues and expenditures are described in detail, and there is an annual
government budget constraint. The uncompensated wage elasticity of total labour sup-
ply is 0.1, which is in line with microeconometric estimates. Thus, the substitution effect
slightly dominates the income effect of a partial change in the consumer real wage rate.
The CGE simulations show, see Figures 1 and 2:
1. An increase in public employment has a positive long run effect on total employ-
ment.
2. A stronger increase in public employment, magnifies the long run effect on total
employment.
3. An increase in public employment has a negative short run effect on total employ-
ment.
[Remark: Figure 1 and 2 about here.]
In a rich model such as MSG6, there are several complex and interacting forces driving
these results. However, systematic studies of the MSG6 reveal the crucial role is played
by the profits from private industries and other types of endogenous non-labour income
received by households, which is positively related to employment in the private sector.
It turns out that the working of the MSG6 model correspond to the case discussed above,
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in which the uncompensated labour supply elasticity, lW , is positive, whereas σ < 1. The
theoretical analysis showed that that the long run equilibrium effect on total employment
is positive in this case, and that the strength of this effect increases when LG grows. It
also showed why the short run employment effect can be negative, also when the long
run effect is positive, i.e. the third simulated result listed above.
4 Discussion and conclusions
This paper has analysed one particular mechanism, which - to my knowledge - has not
previously been recognized in the discussion of how total employment is affected by taxes
used to finance publi emloyment. The premise for the basic idea is that production in
government sectors typically does not generate profits, whereas private production earns
profits in order to provide a competitive return to capital. Thus, when the increase in
public employment crowds out employment in private firms, capital income received by
households fall to the extent that capital and labour complementary inputs. This income
effect adds to the income effect associated with a higher tax rate on labour income, and
contributes to raise labour supply. The presence of this income effect allows a positive
equilibrium relationship between public employment, the labour income tax rate and
total employment. The paper has rigorously clarified the conditions for such a situations.
It cannot be ruled out as unrealistic for theoretical reasons. The theoretical discussion
also showed that a positive long run employment effect of a given increase in public
employment can be progressive, i.e. self-reinforcing. These results describe the long
run employment effect. The paper also shows that the short run effect may be much
stronger and have a different sign due to the temporary effects on consumption caused
by adjustments of the the capital stock.
The empirical relevance of these mechanisms remain unclear. However, they turn out
to be crucial when explaining how increasing tax financed public employment affect total
employment in a realistic CGE model of the Norwegian economy.
In order to have a sharp focus this paper has ignored several potentially relevant effects
influencing how total employment depends on public employment. When discussing the
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employment effect og increasing the provision of public services, it is important to account
for how these services enter the utility function. If they affect private utility, variation in
these services translate into another effect on non-labour income. However, the credo of
this paper is that this discussion can be separated from the one presented here.
Perhaps a more severe shortcoming of the discussion above is that it treats all con-
sumers as identical, also with respect to capital income. In the real world capital income
is much more unevenly distributed than labour income. In the extreme case where all
capital income is received by pensioners or other non-working consumers, the mechan-
ism discussed above has no empirical relevance. This would also be the case if all the
capital income variation affected only those who have a completly inelastic labour sup-
ply behaviour. The importance of these points can only be clarified by further research.
To the extent that they are relevant, it has important implications for disaggregation in
empirical modeling of the determinats of aggregate employment in the long run.
Appendix: Analytical derivations
1. Eq. (2.6): The equilibrium solution of L
Inserting (2.3) and (2.5) into (2.1) yields: LP = aLb
(
1 + LG
LP
)−σ
(T − L)+aL (K −K−1).
(2.2) and (2.1) implies K = aK
aL
LP . The implicit reduced form solution for L follows by
inserting these two expressions into (2.4):
L = LP + LG ⇔ (4.1)
L = aL (C + K −K−1) + LG ⇔
L− LG = aL
(
b (1 + t)−σ (T − L) + K −K−1
)⇔
L− LG = aLb
(
1 +
LG
LP
)−σ
(T − L) + aL aK
aL
(LP − LP−1) ⇔
L− LG = aLb
(
L− LG
L
)σ
(T − L) + aK [L− L−1 − (LG − LG,−1)] (4.2)
2. Eq. (2.8): The long run elasticity of L with respect to LG
Logarithmic differentiation of (2.7) and setting dLG
LG
= 1, implies
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LLG
eG − LP
LG
[
σ
(
L
LP
eG − LG
LP
− eG
)
+
( −L
T − L
)
eG
]
= 1 ⇔ (4.3)
L
LG
eG − σ (eG − 1) + LP
LG
(
L
T − L
)
eG = 1 ⇔[
L
LG
(
1 +
LP
T − L
)
− σ
]
eG = 1− σ ⇔
eG =
1− σ
L
LG
(
T−LG
T−L
)− σ = 1− σH − σ .
3. The interpretation of H−1 = LG
L
(
T−L
T−LG
)
Logarithmic differentiation of L − LG = k (T − L), where k is the constant ratio
between consumption and leisure C
T−L , implies when setting
dLG
LG
= 1: ElLGL|C=kF =
LG
L(1+k)
= LG
L
1
1+
L−LG
T−L
= LG
L
(
T−L
T−LG
)
= H−1. Thus, H−1 is the elasticity of L w.r.t. LG,
contingent on a constant ratio between consumption and leisure.
4. Numerical experiments
The numerical version of the theoretical model is based on the following assumptions:
All prices, or rather price indices, have been normalised to unity in the initial equilibrium.
For transparency variables are measured per capita per day. T = 24 − 10 = 14 after
deduction of 10 hours per day which cannot be freely allocated. In the base case σ =
1, 1,which is in line with economtric estimates of aggregate labour supply in Norway.
Moreover, in the initial equilibrium L = F = 7, LG = 2, and LP = 5. Then t = 2/5.
aL = 3/4 and aK = 1− aL = 1/4. The sum of private consumption and net investments
is set to 1000 NOK per capita per day, of which PLLP = 750 and rK = 250. It follows
that PL = 150. Given these assumptions, a stationary equilibrium with C = 1000 is
consistent with b = 4/3.
Solving this numerical model for different assumptions about tax financed LG and σ
confirm the theoretical results: When σ = 1, L, F/LP , and accordingly F/C, is invariant
to LG. When σ < 1, L is progressively increasing in LG, and the effect is stronger the
lower is σ. When σ > 1, an increase in LG progressively reduces L, and the reduction is
stronger the higher is σ. The limits of this domain are demonstrated by setting σ = 1, 5.
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Then no equilibrium exists when LG is doubled from 2 to 4, because the necessary tax
rate then becomes so high that the representative individual will not demand - for leisure
or for production of private consumption - the hours which has not employed in the public
sector.
5. Eq. (2.15): The short run effect
Assume all exogenous variables but LG constant in period 0. The equilibrium condi-
tion for the labour market (2.6), linearized around the equilibrium in period -1, can be
written:
df0 =
[[
σ
(
LG,−1
L−1 − LG,−1
)
−
(
L−1
T − L−1
)]
dL0
L−1
− σ
(
LG,−1
L−1 − LG,−1
)
dLG,0
LG,−1
]
f−1(4.4)
=
(
σ
LG,−1
L−1
− L−1 − LG,−1
T − L−1
)
dL0 − σdLG,0.
Inserting the expressions for df0, dL and dLG yields the expresion in Eq. (2.15) of the
relationship between dL and dLG in period 0 :
L0 − LG,0 = f (L0, LG,0) + aK [L0 − L−1 − (LG,0 − LG,−1)]
⇔ L−1 + dL0 − (LG,−1 + dLG,0) = f (L−1, LG,−1) + df0 + aK (dL0 − dLG,0)
⇔ L−1 + dL0 − (LG,−1 + dLG,0) = L−1 − LG,−1 + df0 + aK (dL0 − dLG,0)
⇔ dL0 − dLG,0 =
(
σ
LG,−1
L−1
− L−1 − LG,−1
T − L−1
)
dL0 − σdLG,0 + aK (dL0 − dLG,0)
⇔
(
LG,−1
L−1
σ − T − LG,−1
T − L−1 + aK
)
dL0 = (σ − 1 + aK) dLG,0.
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Figure 1. Percentage deviations in public and total employment from a reference scenario 
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Figure 2. Elasticity of total employment with respect to public employment 
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